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Six crewmembers of the cruise ship S/S Norway were killed when the vessel's boiler exploded
on May 25, 2003 while docked in Miami; four crewmembers were injured. Plaintiffs, injured
crewmembers and representatives of the decedents, filed ten separate suits in a Florida circuit court
against defendants Star Cruises and Norwegian Cruise Line ("NC L"), seeking damages for negligence
and unseaworthiness under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688. NC L removed the cases to federal district
court pursuant to § 205 of 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-208 ( the "Convention Act") which implemented the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the
"Convention"), permitting removal prior to trial in disputes relating to an arbitration agreement or award
covered by the Convention.
The crewmembers' employment contracts contained clauses that required arbitration in cases of
claims and disputes arising from a seaman's employment. The contracts were executed in the
Philippines, and their form and content was regulated by a Philippine administrative agency, the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. The district court granted NC L's motion to compel
arbitration in the Philippines and denied plaintiffs' motion to remand to state court. The court retained
jurisdiction to enforce or confirm and resulting arbitral award.
Plaintiffs challenged the district court's jurisdiction by claiming that the case was not covered by
the Convention. The Court of Appeals noted that a district court must order arbitration unless I ) the four
jurisdictional prerequisites are not met or 2) one of the Convention's affirmative defenses applies.
DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. ' PLC, 202 F. 3d 71 ( I st Cir. 2000). The four prerequisites require that
I ) there is an agreement in writing within the meaning of the Convention; 2) the agreement provides for
arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; 3) the agreement arises out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered commercial; and 4) a party to the
agreement is not an American citizen, or that the commercial relationship has some reasonable relation
with one or more foreign states. Std. Bent Glass Corp. v. Glassrobots Oy, 333 F.3d 440 ( 3d Cir. 2003).
The court, finding the second and fourth conditions fulfilled, turned to an analysis of the first and third
conditions, observing that the Convention established a strong presumption in favor of arbitrating
international commercial disputes. Despite language in 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"), providing that " . . . nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of
seamen . . . ," the Court of Appeals held that the exemption's application outside the FAA was restricted
by the second and third chapters of title 9. The court stated that Congress gave the treaty-implementing
statutes primacy over the FAA, with the provisions of the latter applying only where they did not
conflict. The court viewed this hierarchical structure as consistent with the premise that the Convention
trumped prior inconsistent rules of law, in keeping with an exercise of Congress' treaty power and
federal law. The court continued its analysis by engaging in a lengthy technical dissection of§§ 202 and
208 of the Convention before arriving at the conclusion that the arbitration provisions were commercial
legal relationships under the Convention, regardless of the FAA exemption.
Finally, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' affirmative defenses - that the arbitration
provision was unconscionable and that the underlying dispute was not arbitrable - failed and that the
district court had properly granted NC L's motion to compel arbitration.
Alan Katz
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VESSEL IS NOT VICARIOUSLY OR DIRECTLY LIABLE UNDER THE JONES ACT
FOR THE AMATEUR CHIROPRACTIC ACTIVITIES OF ITS EMPLOYEES ABOARD
THE VESSEL, ABSENT EMPLOYER AUTHORIZATION.
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Under the Jones Act, traditional respondeat superior principles are used to determine vicarious
liability of a sea vessel, and a sea vessel is directly liable only if an officer with supervisory duties
over the tortious employee has direct or constructive notice of that employee's tortious activities.

Sobieski v. lspat Island, Inc.
th
United State Court of Appeals for the 7 Circuit
413 F.3d 628
(Decided June 29, 2005)
Plaintiff-appellant Paul Sobieski ( "Sobieski") was a crewman on defendant-appellee's M/V
Joseph L. Block ("the Block"). On April 4, 200 I , he was sitting in a chair in the Block's recreation

room, when fellow crewman Mike Barrett ( "Barrett") snuck up behind him and slammed his head
against Sobieski's right shoulder, doing it for chiropractic reasons. This caused plaintiff's neck to crack,
leading to injuries and pain which continued after the Block went ashore on April 15, 200 I , and which
was exasperated after Sobieski had a "lock up pinch" in his neck in November 200 I .
Sobieski and his wife Gail ( "the plaintiffs") filed two separate complaints; the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment for defendant-appellee on
all of the plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs appealed to the ih Circuit on !1!' i1 .Jones Act claims and the court
affirmed.
h
Plaintiffs' first argument to the i Circuit alleged that the dciCnJant was vicariously liable for
Barrett's conduct. The Sobieskis asked the court to abrogate the common law scope of employment
rule, as it applied to the Jones Act, because seamen are always within the scope of employment when
aboard sea vessels, even while off-duty. The plaintiffs then advocated an "enterprise liability" theory
favored by§ 229 of the Restatement ( Second) of Agency. Wilson v. Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul &
th
Pac[fic R.R., 841 F.2d 1347, 1355-56 ( 7 Cir.1988). However, the court rejected this approach because
a vicarious liability claim requires a plaintiff to prove an employee's tortious act was committed in
furtherance of the employer's business, and the court was not prepared to ignore traditional respondeat
superior principles, absent express statutory language in the Jones Act. Barrett's off-duty act of neck
cracking was not a "necessary incident" or "essential" to his duties as a mate's assistant. Rogers v. Chi.
th
& N. W. Trans. Co., 947 F.2d 83 7, 839 ( 7 Cir. 1991). Rather, it was done for personal reasons, not with
defendant's express authorization, and therefore the act fell outside the scope of employment. !d. at 839
( quoting Wilson 841 F. 2d at 1355).
The plaintiffs' second argument alleged direct liability, a claim which makes an employer liable
regardless of whether an employee's tortious conduct was in furtherance of the employer's business.
Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 773 F.2d 807, 818 (ih Cir. I 985). They supported their contention with
Barrett's deposition, where he stated that defendant's officers had seen him crack necks aboard the
Block, and the plaintiffs argued the defendant therefore had at least constructive knowledge of Barrett's
neck-cracking reputation. However, the court did not accept this analysis because plaintiffs failed to
provide sufficient evidence demonstrating the defendant had proper notice through its officers of
Barrett's neck-cracking activities. Not only was Barrett's neck "tractioning" on the Block not known to
be "common and continuous," but the only person the plaintiffs identified as an officer with notice was
assistant steward George Oram ( "Oram"), who failed to classify as an "officer" since he held no
supervisory duties over Barrett.
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The Court held that the summary judgment for defendant was appropriate, since no reasonable
juror could conclude the defendant was liable under the Jones Act claims for vicarious and direct
liability.
Gregory Bougopoulos
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DISTRICT COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES AND IMPOSITION OF A MARITIME
LIEN ON A VESSEL WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's exercise of jurisdiction
in a diversity suit brought by a Cayman Islands Corporation, the owner of a motor yacht, against
a Florida contractor.

However, the Court vacated the district court's judgment awarding

damages to the contractor and imposing a maritime lien on the yacht because the contractor failed
to provide any evidence by which a trier of fact could infer that its charges were reasonable
according to industry standards. Reasonable price was a required element of the contractor's
burden of proof in establishing such a lien and collecting damages.

Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. V. APJ Marine, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals for the I I th Circuit
41 I F.3d 1242
(Decided June 8, 2005)
Defendant-appellee/Cross-appellant APJ Marine, Inc. ("APJ") appealed the district court's
exercise of diversity jurisdiction over claims brought by Plaintiff-appellant/Cross-appellee Sweet Pea
Marine, Ltd. ("Sweet Pea"), owner of the vessel M/V SWEET PEA ("the Vessel"). Sweet Pea appealed
the district court's award of damages to APJ and imposition of a maritime lien on the Vessel.
In September of 1999, representatives of APJ and Sweet Pea reached an oral agreement to
redesign and refit the interior of the Vessel, a 127-foot motor yacht. The agreement established various
hourly wage rates for labor and allowed APJ to charge Sweet Pea a 15% mark-up on materials and
supplies which it purchased for the Vessel. After paying APJ$4.3 million according to the agreed-upon
rates, Sweet Pea terminated APJ in November of 200 I for work completion delays as well as billing
irregularities revealed by an audit. In March of 2002, APJ sent Sweet Pea a bill for$1.292 million in
outstanding costs incurred prior to termination. Sweet Pea refused to pay and on May 17, 2002 filed a
complaint against APJ in federal court, based on diversity jurisdiction, containing several allegations
including breach of an oral contract, negligent misrepresentation and fraud in the inducement. On May
22, 2002, APJ filed a complaint in federal court under admiralty jurisdiction; in personam against Sweet
Pea and in rem against the Vessel for$1.292 million. The complaint alleged breach of an oral contract
under maritime law and a claim for a maritime lien. The district court consolidated the two actions for
discovery purposes, but allowed them to proceed on separate dockets.
On October 20, 2003, both actions were tried together. After a two-week trial, the jury awarded
Sweet Pea$239,000 in damages on its breach of warranty claim. In its advisory capacity, the jury found
for APJ on its maritime claims in the amount of$244,000. The district court found that APJ was not
entitled to compensation for labor by subcontractors because Sweet Pea had already paid for work
performed. However, because evidence showed that APJ had paid vendors$1,631,262.15 for goods and
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